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Abstract In this article, I explore select case studies
of Parkinson patients treated with deep brain stimu-
lation (DBS) in light of the notions of alienation and
authenticity. While the literature on DBS has so far
neglected the issues of authenticity and alienation, I
argue that interpreting these cases in terms of these
concepts raises new issues for not only the philo-
sophical discussion of neuro-ethics of DBS, but also
for the psychological and medical approach to
patients under DBS. In particular, I suggest that the
experience of alienation and authenticity varies from
patient to patient with DBS. For some, alienation can
be brought about by neurointerventions because
patients no longer feel like themselves. But, on the
other hand, it seems alienation can also be cured by
DBS as other patients experience their state of mind
as authentic under treatment and retrospectively
regard their former lives without stimulation as
alienated. I argue that we must do further research
on the relevance of authenticity and alienation to
patients treated with DBS in order to gain a deeper
philosophical understanding, and to develop the best
evaluative criterion for the behavior of DBS patients.
Keywords Deep brain stimulation . Authenticity .
Alienation . Autonomy. Brain pacemaker . Implant
ethics
Introduction: Problems of Authenticity
and Alienation in the Use of DBS
Outline of the Paper
Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a practice that has
been used since the late 1980s mainly for Parkinson
patients, but also for the treatment of diseases such as
epilepsy and for the experimental treatment of
psychiatric and other diseases (cf. [1, 2]).1 In DBS
for Parkinson patients, a so-called ‘brain pacemaker’
is implanted, and its electrodes in the brain stimulate
either the subthalamic nucleus or the globus pallidus
([3]: 533ff.) in order to treat movement disorders,
tremors, and freezing that are typical for Parkinson’s
disease. While DBS can vastly improve motor
abilities, it is well-known that DBS can also have
psychiatric side-effects, such as hypomania and manic
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episodes ([4], cit in [5]). The fact that DBS as a
treatment sometimes brings about personality changes
invites philosophical considerations about problems
of personal authenticity and alienation in this context.
It raises the question of whether, under treatment,
patients feel no longer like themselves. In other
words, we may wonder whether under treatment
patients can remain‚ authentic ‘or become‚ alienated’
from their true selves (notions I define below in
Section Felt Authenticity and Felt Alienation: Some
Conceptual Clarifications).
In order to bring out the relevance of the notions of
authenticity and alienation to the neuro-ethics of
DBS, I focus on several case studies of patients under
DBS treatment (cf. [6]). What is significant about
these narratives is that they each involve elements of
authenticity and alienation, although not in a uniform
way. Some patients claim under treatment that they
feel authentic, i.e. like themselves, and regard their
life with Parkinson’s disease retrospectively as a time
of alienation. Other patients, however, claim that the
treatment deprives them of their authenticity and that
they no longer feel like themselves when under DBS.
As a first approximation, one could say that it seems
as if DBS could threaten authenticity and bring about
alienation in some cases, whereas it generates feelings
of authenticity in others.
Accordingly, in this article, I argue for the
following thesis: We should take into consideration
patients ‘feelings of authenticity and alienation when
talking about the chances and challenges of deep
brain stimulation. The concepts of authenticity and
alienation are useful heuristic tools not only for a
better philosophical understanding of the patients’
experience of DBS, but also, in some cases, the use of
these concepts can even lead to a re-evaluation of the
treatment and its side-effects, and should, therefore,
contribute to future ethical reflection on DBS.
While it is not my aim in the current paper to
suggest specific ethical guidelines for treatment, I do
wish to suggest that future ethical discussions will
profit by considering the notions of authenticity and
alienation, which I outline here. I argue that we must
do further research on the relevance of authenticity
and alienation to patients treated with DBS in order to
gain a deeper philosophical understanding, and to
develop the best evaluative criterion for the behavior
of DBS patients. If research supports the thesis of the
present article, then the tools psychologists and
doctors currently use to evaluate DBS patients should
be complemented by philosophical considerations,
because the medical accounts alone are failing to take
into account the important subjective-dimensions of
authenticity and alienation. This is deeply problematic
because it doesn’t give the doctor, patient, or family
involved the fullest sense of what is going on, nor
does it give them clear guide-lines for how to evaluate
the patient’s behavioral changes.
While there is indeed a plethora of literature on the
ethics of DBS, there is not much literature that deals
specifically and systematically with the questions of
authenticity and alienation, as I do here. An exception
is the recent article on narrative identity and self-
experience under DBS by Müller et al. [7] that brings
in the concepts of authenticity and alienation. Many
of its findings support the thesis of the present
article.2 However, the majority of authors tackle
issues related to authenticity in the context of DBS,
such as personal identity3 [8–11], patient autonomy
and responsibility [1, 2, 12, 29, 35, 36], and happiness
(cf. [13]) without actually focusing on authenticity.4
Meanwhile, Carter et al. raise the problem of
authenticity in the context of the medication of
patients with dopamine sensitive drugs, but not in
the context of DBS [14]. Finally, Bolt brings up the
issue of authenticity in the context of neuro-
enhancement [15]. However, with the exception of
Müller et al. [7], none of these recent articles on
authenticity and neuro-ethics focus primarily on
2 The article by Müller et al. [7] interprets new and original
empirical material from patient interviews conducted in the
Charité in Berlin. It does not deal with the article from
Schüpbach et al. [6] that is central for the present article.
Schermer [13] brings up the notion of authenticity in the
context of DBS as well, but without going into detail about it.
Schermer seems to bring ‘authenticity’ very close to ‘autono-
my’ and lies her focus on the latter.
3 Problems of authenticity should be distinguished from
problems of identity because the question of identity in the
classical Lockean sense is primarily one of numerical identity
over time. In contrast, the key-question of authenticity is which
of the different ‘selves’ can count as the ‘real’ one, i.e. the true
self.
4 Schechtman [9]: 136ff. interprets the case studies by Schüpbach
et al. as well. Her notion of personal identity sometimes comes
close to what I regard as authenticity; however, she does not go
into detail about these and similar terminological points. On her
understanding, a patient’s ‘true self’ is what is at stake once
sudden personality changes take place under treatment. For a
psychiatric account of autonomy and mental competence, see
[29].
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DBS.5 By my lights, this is a gap in the literature,
which this article attempts to begin filling in.
In order to support my view, I begin, in
Section Felt Authenticity and Felt Alienation: Some
Conceptual Clarifications, by giving a minimalist
definition of what I mean by the concepts of
authenticity and alienation. In section A Philosophical
Interpretation of Some Case Studies from Schüpbach
et al. [6], I then present three case studies from a
psychological report by Schüpbach et al. [6], offering
a philosophical analysis of these cases in light of
authenticity and alienation. In Section Conclusions,
some conclusions follow: When analyzing the case
studies from a philosophical point of view, aspects of
the patients’ experience are emphasized, which are
not fully appreciated in the psychological assessment.
As we will see, for many of the patients, their
experience involved recognizing, exploring, and
enacting what they regarded as their ‘true selves’.
The most important aim of this paper is to bring
out a subjective side of DBS treatment, which has so
far not received the attention that it ought to receive.
My goal in presenting these case studies is to
illuminate the ways in which the subjective notions
of authenticity and alienation are relevant to the
philosophical and ethical discussion of DBS, as well
as to how we are to evaluate the behavior of DBS
patients.
Felt Authenticity and Felt Alienation:
Some Conceptual Clarifications
The terms ‘alienation’ and ‘authenticity’ have a long
philosophical history and have been recently revital-
ized in current debates in social and moral philoso-
phy. While the concept of ‘alienation’ has its roots in
Marxism, it has recently gained purchase in current
discussions in social philosophy (cf. 39). Meanwhile,
the concept of ‘authenticity’ with its rather heteroge-
neous roots in the work of St. Augustine, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, and existentialist writers such as
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre, has gained more
and more attention in recent decades, beginning with
Lionard Trilling’s famous lectures on sincerity and
authenticity as moral ideals ([16]; cf. [17]: 46).6
Indeed, ‘authenticity’ underwent a renaissance in the
1980s, triggered by Charles Taylor’s Sources of the
Self [18] and The Ethics of Authenticity [19] (cf. also
[20]: 29f.), and, even now, we see it playing a role in
important debates in bio-ethics, which I discuss
below. However, in spite of the resurgence of these
concepts in contemporary debates, ‘authenticity’ and
‘alienation’ are notoriously vague concepts, and I
want to offer some preliminary remarks to clarify how
I will be using them here.
In general, I regard authenticity and alienation as
felt mental states, where authenticity is indicated by a
person saying things such as ‘I feel like myself’, and
alienation is indicated by statements such as ‘I am not
myself’ or ‘I am no longer myself’. On my
interpretation, authenticity and alienation are oppo-
sites: a person who is authentic is not alienated, and
vice versa. In other words: ‘alienation’ here means
‘inauthenticity’. Moreover, I take authenticity and
alienation to be experiences, which involve an
important normative dimension: we experience au-
thenticity as something we ought to strive for,
whereas alienation is experienced as something we
ought to avoid. In this regard, my account draws on
Trilling’s and Taylor’s views of authenticity and
Rahel Jaeggi’s account of alienation, which I discuss
below. That being said, while authenticity and
alienation are indicated by the above kind of state-
ments, this does not mean that they are simple
phenomena. As I suggest in what follows, the
experience of authenticity and alienation are multi-
dimensional, and, although, I take my starting point
from the above mentioned feelings of being ‘myself’
or ‘not myself’, I think it best to keep the details of
these experiences fairly flexible and wide open, at
least for now. In what follows, I treat these two
notions in a normative way, i.e. I regard authenticity
as a state to be striven for, and alienation as a state to
be avoided or overcome.
5 Other recent articles focus on authenticity within the broader
context of neuro-ethics and neuro-enhancement or special fields
within both. Among them are Bublitz & Merkel [23], Kraemer
[27], and Erler [30].
6 For a discussion of authenticity in relation to St. Augustine’s
notion of the human soul, its relation to God, and the ‚highest
goal in life’, see [41]: 15 ff., [40], and [22]: 174. For a
discussion of Rousseau’s idea of the authentic state of mind as
the one in which the individual has stripped off her societal
bonds and has returned to a natural mode, free from social
coercion and deceit, see [41]: 55–60; [17]: 33f.. And, for the
discussion of existentialism and authenticity, see [41]: 132–4;
143–5; 149–151, and [40], mentioned below.
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Therefore, before we proceed, I want to say a bit
more about the ‘normative’ connotations I take to be
built into the notions of authenticity and alienation,
for this is a contentious issue. Let’s begin with the
normative underpinnings of authenticity. As men-
tioned before, the more recent use of ‘authenticity’ as
a normative term can be traced back to Trilling’s
lectures, where he argues that authenticity is a moral
ideal ([16]; cf. [17]: 46). This normative use of
authenticity was furthered in Taylor’s work, The
Ethics of Authenticity [19], where he describes how
authenticity became a moral ideal, especially in the
United States (cf. also [20]: 29f.). Between the
work of Trilling and Taylor, then, the notion
‘authenticity’ has emerged or re-emerged as a
normative concept, capturing a moral ideal that a
person ought to strive for and a virtue one ought to
possess ([41]: 2).
Even more recently, authenticity construed in this
normative fashion has shaped debates in applied
ethics, in particular, the organ transplantation debate
and the debate about enhancement. In the debate
about organ transplantation, authenticity plays a role,
insofar as the question has been raised concerning
when a patient regards her transplanted organ as a part
of her real self, and the ethical issues that arise
accordingly (cf. [21]). Meanwhile, in the enhance-
ment debate, the notion of authenticity plays a major
role as well, where the question has been raised
concerning whether enhancement interventions lead
to the revelation of the ‘true self’, e.g. whether the
intake of lifestyle drugs, such as the antidepressant
Prozac, leads to ‘feelings of authenticity’ (cf. e.g. [17,
22]). As Carl Elliott puts it in Better Than Well:
American Medicine Meets the American Dream: ‘The
ideal of authenticity drives much of the language that
patients and clients use to describe their use of
enhancement technologies. Technologies from Prozac
to face-lifts are routinely described as tools of self-
discovery and self-fulfilment’ ([17]: 30). In this
context, enhancement has been regarded positively
as a means to achieving the ideal of authenticity and
as something that enables self-realization.
By my lights, what we see in both bio-ethics
debates is that the notion of ‘authenticity’, construed
in a normative fashion and understood as self-
realization, is helpful in our efforts to understand the
ethics of the medical interventions at stake. Indeed, as
I will show in this article, the normative notion
‘authenticity’ can be fruitfully applied to the topic of
DBS.7 As we will see, some reports suggest that some
DBS patients feel that they have found their ‘real’,
‘better’ or even ‘ideal selves’ under treatment.8 This
suggests that, under therapy, they have become how
they always wanted to be and call this their ‘real
selves’. Such an experience accompanying a neuro-
intervention is oftentimes facilitated by increasing
feelings of self-confidence and self-love (cf. [22]:
175). Thus, DBS seems to allow some patients to
achieve ‘authenticity’ and achieve the ideal they have
been striving for.
However, it should be noted that some authors
express doubts whether ‘authenticity’ is a normative
concept and whether it should play a prominent role for
ethical assessment at all (cf. [23]). For them, ‘authentic-
ity’ is just a synonym for a positive, pleasant state of
mind and, therefore, a superfluous notion. Accordingly,
for them, it is not a normative concept and should not
be used for ethical assessment.
A way to meet this objection is to point out that on
my interpretation, authenticity involves feeling like
oneself, but this does not necessarily mean that this is
a pleasurable experience. In other words, the feelings of
pleasure sometime come apart from the feelings of ‘like
myself’. Vice versa, a state of alienation can even be
subjectively experienced positively – Heidegger’s ‘Das
Man’ would be a good example. Yet, some authors who
want to discard ‘authenticity’ as a normative notion in
ethical debates actually use this idea to their advantage.
For them, the very fact that ‘authenticity’ can designate
something negative is a sign that it cannot be taken
seriously as a normative concept at all, because if it isn’t
7 Still, one has to keep in mind that DBS as the topic of the
present paper is nowadays normally used for treatment and not
enhancement purposes. DBS involves surgery, which usually
implies considerable health risks. It is, therefore, unlikely that it
will enter the enhancement market easily. Cf. [17]: 156 deals
with a fictitious technology that resembles a brain pacemaker,
but is used as a technology for mood enhancement, especially
among elderly people who feel alienated from their lives spent
in nursing homes.
8 A discussion of the notoriously difficult distinction between
one’s ‘real self’ and one’s ‘ideal self’ goes beyond the scope of
this paper, but has been discussed in the literature. As e.g.
[20]:30 points out, numerous ‘restauration narratives’ in which
people tell how they felt before and after enhancement
interventions actually bring up a ‘true self’ that had allegedly
existed before during their lives, whereas in fact they have
rather reached a ideal state through means of enhancement.
486 F. Kraemer
something desirable, it isn’t clear how it could be a
virtue to seek or an ideal to pursue.
I think these objections are valuable insofar as they
press on the fact that it is very difficult to identify
what exactly is involved in the feeling of authenticity.
This is due, in part, to the fact that the concept of
authenticity is an amalgam arising out of different
traditions, each of which uses the concept to identify
different phenomena. And, insofar as we have
inherited the notion from these traditions, our own
understanding of authenticity does and should reflect
these multiple dimensions of authenticity. Indeed,
authenticity cannot be distilled to one particular,
simple phenomenon; rather, it is a complex phenom-
enon, with many different aspects and sides.
Nevertheless, it is my view that there is a complex
phenomenon associated with ‘authenticity’, which has
normative underpinnings and promise as a tool in
ethical assessment. This has been borne out in the
recent debate over enhancement. As mentioned
before, in this debate, we have seen the notion of
authenticity gain purchase because it has proven to be
useful in the efforts to describe numerous relevant
phenomena, phenomena which are crucial to under-
standing the ethics of enhancement (cf. [24]). Given
these promising results in the enhancement debate, we
have reason to be hopeful that the notion of
‘authenticity’, used in the positive, normative sense
can shed light on our understanding of the ethics of
DBS. Indeed, as we will see in the case studies below,
some patients claim to feel like they have found their
‘true selves’ or ‘ideal selves’ and cite this as a
desirable outcome of their treatment, which suggests
that authenticity, normatively construed, does have
purchase in the debate over DBS.9 In the end, though,
while the notion of authenticity should play a part in
these debates, in order to do justice to its various
aspects, it seems wise to keep the exact meaning of
‘authenticity’ as open and flexible as possible at the
beginning. Still, the common starting point for my
analysis of the case studies will be the normative
notion that centres around a patient feeling ‘like
herself’ after treatment.
Turning our attention now to the notion of
‘alienation’, as I said before, I take this to be a felt
state, which is the opposite of authenticity, indicated
by statements such as ‘I no longer feel like myself’.
Just as with ‘authenticity’, it is a mistake to think that
‘alienation’ is a simple, straightforward feeling;
rather, it too is a multi-dimensional phenomenon.
My understanding of it comes close to what Jaeggi
defines in a recent monograph on alienation as ‘a
relation of relationlessness’ (in the German: ‘eine
Beziehung der Beziehungslosigkeit’; [25]: 12).10 More
precisely, Jaeggi claims, ‘alienation is said to consist
in a distorted relation to oneself and to one’s world
that can be characterized as the failure adequately to
appropriate oneself or the world, to make oneself or
the world ‘one’s own’.11 As she suggests, a feeling of
alienation from oneself is often intimately connected
with feeling alienated from things closely related to a
person, i.e. from her own body, from her work, from
social relationships, or from her partner and family.12
This feeling of alienation has negative consequences,
such as the following suggested by Frederick Neu-
houser: ‘a sense of meaninglessness or estrangement,
a loss of power in relation to self and world, and a
subjugation to the products of one’s own activity’
[26]. As will become clear later on, exactly these
feelings play a key-role in the DBS narratives.
Moreover, just as with ‘authenticity’, it seems
‘alienation’ has potential in certain bio-ethics debates,
because if a patient feels alienated as a result of
treatment, this should be taken into considerations in
our normative assessment of those treatments.
So far, I have suggested that authenticity and
alienation are normative notions that turn on subjec-
tive self-ascriptions; however, it should be noted that
a person’s self-assessment can, of course, conflict
with what other people say about her, be it family or
friends. Although self-acclaimed authenticity is a
subjective notion, this does not rule out the possibility
9 This use of the term is in accordance with numerous case
studies and considerations discussed in the enhancement debate
(cf. [31] and [32]). However, the fact that ‘authenticity’ usually
has normative connotations does not mean that one is
immediately entitled to draw normative conclusions from the
results in this article. As mentioned above, I am not providing
ethical guidelines, but rather merely describing phenomena of
felt authenticity and alienation.
10 Jaeggi [25], ‘Entfremdung’, cf. for the English translation of
the terms cf. review by Neuhouser, Fredrick [26] from whom
the quoted sentence stems.
11 Neuhouser [26] about Jaeggi [25].
12 The relation between a person and her work life is an
especially important one in the historical debate, in which
alienation of a person from her work is usually construed as the
starting point of an alienating self-relation.
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that other people can reasonably contribute to a
person’s self-understanding and, to some degree, can
even intersubjectively correct it (cf. [27]). As the first
three case studies show, the first- and the third-person
perspective (i.e. the one of family members, doctors,
and psychologists) and their respective ascriptions of
authenticity to a person can differ sharply when it
comes to assessing whether a person is authentic or
alienated.
Ultimately, the aim of the present article is to shed
some light on the normative underpinnings of the
dimensions of felt-authenticity and felt-alienation of
DBS patients in order to show that these notions
should play a key role in the ethical debate about
DBS – a discussion that has up to now mainly
centered round the concepts of autonomy and
responsibility.
A Philosophical Interpretation of Some Case
Studies from Schüpbach et al. [6]
The Case Studies
In what follows, I present and interpret three case
studies of patients who experienced behavioral
changes after DBS treatment. These case studies stem
from an article by Schüpbach et al. [6] in the journal
Neurology. In that article, Schüpbach et al. report their
findings from a study conducted by psychologists,
neurologists, and a psychiatrist between 2000 and
2003 of 29 Parkinson patients (15 male, 14 female)
treated with DBS. The interview technique is de-
scribed as ‘[r]epeated open, unstructured interviews
conducted by trained psychologists […], neurologists
[…], and a psychiatrist […]’ in order to ‘qualitatively
assess the impact of STN stimulation on the patients’
personal, marital, and socio-professional life.‘([6]:
1811f.).13 The original aim of the study was to ’pro-
spectively examine ‘kinds of ’social maladjustment
experienced by 29 patients with PD before and 18 to
24 months after bilateral STN stimulation’ ([6]: 1811,
my italics, FK).14
However, I argue that the emphasis on the notions
‘social adaptation’ and ‘maladaptation’ or ‘maladjust-
ment’ fails to capture an important dimension of the
patients’ experience, namely, the subjective experi-
ence of authenticity and alienation. Accordingly, I
offer a different interpretation of these cases, relying
on the heuristic tools of authenticity and alienation,
which aims at showing that the application of these
concepts makes the content of the case studies more
accessible to philosophers and ethicists, and, more-
over, reveals that what the psychologists interpreted
as ‘maladaption’ can, in fact, be interpreted in a
different and positive philosophical light. This sug-
gests that maybe we need to construct new tools for
evaluating patients’ behavior in the future, which
reflect not only the third-personal ‘adaption’ criteria,
but also the first-personal self-ascriptions of authen-
ticity and alienation. We are now in the position to
look at some case-studies.
Patient 1: ‘I don’t recognize myself anymore, […] I
feel like a machine’15
Patient 1, a 38-year-old female journalist married
with one child, had PD (caused by a mutation in
the parkin gene) for 30 years […] with motor
fluctuations and severe dyskinesias. Before stimula-
tion, in spite of her motor handicap, she was
dynamic: ‘Combating the disease gave meaning to
my life. I hope that stimulation will allow me to get
on with my life and my projects. ‘Six months after
the operation, the patient was not satisfied in spite of
a 75% improvement of her motor handicap and the
withdrawal of her antiparkinson medication. She
complained that the stimulator was not well
programmed and she wanted to be able to adjust it
herself at home. After 18 months of stimulation, she
was no longer able to work, had a loss of inspiration
and a taste for her work and for life in general. ‘Now
I feel like a machine, I’ve lost my passion. I don’t
recognize myself anymore. ‘Her family no longer
interested her, she was easily exhausted, and had a
13 STN (subthalamic nucleus stimulation) is a type of DBS, cf.
[9]: 136.
14 The results of these case studies stem from a small study and,
as such, they should not be over-generalized (cf. [33] with
respect to the selective use of individual empirical studies). The
aim of this article is to present some first reflections based on
similar cases that can only prove their validity in future case
studies.
15 The subtitles are introduced by the author of the present
article to structure the cases.
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loss of vitality (in the absence of a depressive
syndrome), which led her to interrupt all professional
activity. In short, a loss of vitality and a goal in life
occurred despite major improvement of her motor
symptoms by STN stimulation. ([6]: 1812).
A short analysis of this case reveals that four
elements of felt-alienation and the loss of authenticity
are at work in the patient’s experience:
First, after successful treatment, the patient feels
alienated from her work and indulges in leisure
activities instead.16 This will be surprising to the
reader given that she proclaimed that one of her main
aims in undergoing the treatment was enhancing her
ability to work. However, although her motor disabil-
ity has improved remarkably, she nevertheless expe-
riences her formerly much-beloved work as alienating
after surgery.
Second, she experiences alienation from herself
because she has lost a goal in life. It seems that
this is the case because she no longer has
anything to fight for and this has resulted in a
loss of energy. She even goes so far as to say,‘I
don’t recognize myself anymore’ – presumably
because she used to be goal-oriented and energetic,
but now has lost her drive, which she identified
with. This corresponds with what Schüpbach et al.
[6] suggest:
Fighting PD was a driving force for many
patients that was frustrated in 12 (41%) after
surgery […] causing disorientation. As
expressed by another patient: ‘Before stimula-
tion, I wanted to be like everybody else, I didn’t
want to be considered only as sick. I fought for
that every day! Now I find myself less impas-
sioned, I regret the period where I did battle.
Now it’s the warrior’s repose, I no longer have
something to struggle against, my life is empty.
I get up every day, but have no goal, no
horizon.’ ([6]: 1814).
Third, the patient feels alienated because she feels
heteronomous – ‘like a machine’, as she puts it. The
case report does not give any details, but this may be
due to the fact that a mechanical device is implanted
in her brain. Phenomenologically speaking, it could
be that the patient perceives the device as an alien
technology that, as it were, remote-controls her
feelings, behavior and thoughts (cf. [21]: 169 ff.)17.
Another patient reports feeling ‘like an electronic
doll’ ([6]: 1815). As Schüpbach et al. put it: ‘The
altered body image may result from difficulty in
accepting psychologically the implanted material, as
previously described in patients with pacemakers and
implantable cardioverter defibrillators.’18
What is interesting here, however, is that the self-
description of some patients of being remote-
controlled by an electronic device runs contrary to
the patients’ actual gain in autonomy, because their
motor abilities usually improve remarkably under
treatment. In a certain sense, patients become more
autonomous after successful surgery because they
have a better command of their body. But in another,
Aristotelian sense, a feeling of heteronomy arises: if a
person is not entirely ‘self-moved’, but is or feels
moved by a force outside her control, she might feel
heteronomous. In this case study, the feeling of
heteronomy goes hand in hand with the patient
feeling alienated from life.
Fourth, this case raises another key issue involving
authenticity and alienation: the split between mind
and body. The authors of the study even chose this
phenomenon to be the report’s subtitle: ‘A distressed
mind in a repaired body’. They reveal that some
patients experience feelings of alienation from their
improved health condition. As the authors also report
about other patients, some of them do not yet dare to
trust their bodies and are aware of the fact that their
disease will come back at some point (‘negative
16 In the Introduction, I drew a distinction between alienation
from work and alienation from self. The connection of both
deserves closer discussion in the future.
17 Svenaeus [21] is a good example of literature dealing with
the question of embodiment from a phenomenological perspec-
tive that pays attention to patients’ subjective feelings. Dealing
with the case of organ transplantation, Sveneaus emphasizes
that the relation of a person towards her own body is
meaningful with respect to her relation to the world. From this
point of view, we are our bodies, rather than possessing them.
Svenaeus does not explicitly tackle problems of alienation and
authenticity, but alludes to the fact that receiving someone
else’s organs could change a person’s self-image as a whole. In
a similar vein, the same could hold for the implantation of a
device such as a brain pacemaker.
18 Nevertheless the researchers remark that ‘it is surprising that
this difficulty was not observed in a greater number of patients’
([6]: 1815). In Müller et al. [7] one finds ambivalent accounts
of patients’ coping with the feeling of being alienated from
their own bodies.
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anticipation’). ‘In spite of successful surgery,
8 patients (28%) felt mentally unable to resume a
more normal life style. Although with STN stimula-
tion they could, they did not dare to perform activities
that had been impossible with PD before surgery. Past
experience led to a negative anticipation that was
objectively unjustified after surgery. ‘My body is
cured, but my mind is still sick,’ said one patient ([6]:
1814). This is exemplified by Patient 1: although she
describes herself as physically healed, her psycholog-
ical condition cannot catch up to this new bodily
state. This results in a feeling of alienation because
the patient experiences her body as being in a state
different than the one of her mind.19
To sum up these findings, this first case study
shows a patient who, under treatment, has lost her
felt-authenticity and eventually feels alienated from
herself in several respects. After treatment, not only
does her work-life seem alienating, but also she feels
alienated from life-goals she identified with, as well
as from her new, improved body (cf. [6]: 1814).20 In
the following case study, however, the patient
experiences an opposite result.
Patient 2: ‘During all these years I was asleep, now I
am going to take my life in hand, my life before PD’
‘Patient 2, a 48-year-old male accountant, worked
half-time for 7 years because of PD […]. Before
the operation, his wife assisted him in all tasks of
daily living, assumed all domestic and financial
responsibilities, spent hours with him, and helped
him to conceal his disease from his entourage.
After 18 months of stimulation, his motor condition
was much improved […]. The patient regained
confidence in himself and aspired to more autono-
my: ‘I want to recover my social standing and
establish new relationships outside my couple.
During all these years of illness, I was asleep.
Now I am stimulated, stimulated to lead a different
life.’ Confronted with the radical change in her
husband’s behavior, his wife became depressed:
‘Ever since the operation, I feel lost. Before, when
he was sick, we were a perfect couple. Now, he
wants to live the life of a young man, go out, meet
new people, all of that is intolerable! I would rather
he be like he was before, always nice and docile!’
The patient persisted in his desire for change: ‘All
these years I allowed myself to be carried like a
child, because I didn’t have the means to fight.
That period is over, I want to get back the position
I left open. I am going to take my life in hand, my
life before PD.’ In short, a grave marital conflict
was caused by the newly regained autonomy of the
patient and his wife’s loss of status as caregiver.
([6]: 1812)
This story differs considerably from the first one.
This patient says that under treatment he now feels
like himself, whereas before he felt alienated, i.e. not
himself. In this case, what is gained from the
treatment is authenticity, qua implicit self-ascription
at least. The patient claims that in all the years of
illness he was ‘asleep’. This can be interpreted as him
saying that he was not aware of himself, i.e. not in a
self-conscious mode and, therefore, in this sense not
really ‘himself’.21 From a philosophical point of view,
this could mean that he did not possess any self-
19 Here, it has to be remarked that DBS is by no means a cure.
It only helps to control some symptoms, but the neurodegen-
erative disease is still there and progresses. Some symptoms are
under better control through stimulation than before by
medication. Therefore, the patient’s utterance is not to be taken
literally, nor is the title of Schupbach’s et al. ‘A distressed mind
in a repaired body’. Whenever the present article talks about the
‘healed’ or ‘cured’ body after DBS, this is to be understood in a
figurative way: some patients might indeed feel cured, because
some of their preeminent symptoms are under better control
and they are able to resume to their former lives.
20 In this vein, what is especially interesting about DBS in
comparison to other neuro-interventions is the interaction
between internality and externality of a neuro-technology with
respect to the human body. This can best be explained if one
compares DBS to transcranial stimulation. On the one hand, via
DBS, the patient herself, or another person, can change the
patient’s mental state by switching the pacemaker on or off
from the outside. In this respect, DBS brings about similar
results like transcranial stimulation with which one can
influence cognitive performance and emotions from the outside.
On the other hand, in the case of DBS, the pacemaker and the
electrodes have become a part of the patient’s brain and body,
and the technology is ‘internal’. By contrast, transcranial
stimulation is an externally applied intervention that does not
merge with the body and its functions. In the case of DBS, the
interaction on of internality and externality brings about
especially interesting questions of authenticity that have to do
with the alienation some DBS patients feel from their own
bodies and states of mind.
21 There seems to be a gap between not being self-conscious
and not feeling like yourself. It seems like there must be some
sort of minimal self-consciousness involved in the patient’s
experience, but that the self that he is conscious of is not really
his ‘true self’.
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reflective capacities and could not lead his life
autonomously.
As he puts it after successful surgery: ‘I want to
regain my life, my life before PD’. In stating this, he
refers to the life before his illness that was really his,
his real life, he being conscious of himself and
‘master of his own destiny’, as one could say. During
the years of illness, however, according to his own
retrospective assessment, he feels he was not himself,
i.e. inauthentic, alienated, and not fully conscious.
His life was not really his own, existing as someone
else’s heteronomous object of care. This is at least
how he describes his time of illness in hindsight.
With respect to authenticity and alienation, at least
three points about his case are important.
First, the patient’s self-ascription of authenticity is
interesting. It seems that, after surgery, the patient
distinguishes two modi in his life. On the one hand,
there is ‘mode one’, the mode he experienced when
he was healthy before Parkinson’s disease struck him.
This mode he experiences retrospectively as his
‘authentic mode’. On the other hand, there is ‘mode
two’, the mode he experienced when he became sick.
He says in hindsight that this mode is one in which he
was not authentic, but ‘asleep’ and thus alienated.
Finally, once he is successfully treated via DBS and
switches back to ‘mode one’, he begins to feel
authentic again.
The second remarkable point is that this contradicts
what Patient 1 had reported. Adapting the model from
above, she experienced ‘mode two’, i.e. the mode of
being diseased, as her most authentic mode. When
she was sick, she had something to strive for: to
overcome her disease and to lead a meaningful life
despite her handicaps. The daily struggle gave her life
meaning. When she returns to ‘mode one’ as the
mode of health, however, she describes herself as
feeling alienated, because she has lost her goal in life.
It seems she no longer experiences herself as
authentic once she is healthy.
On a theoretical level, this points towards the fact that
the ascriptions of authenticity and alienation depend on
subjective factors. It seems there is no general, trans-
individually valid correlation between being healthy
and feeling authentic, and being sick and feeling
alienated. On the one hand, an existentialist or
phenomenological notion of authenticity, which empha-
sizes mortality, fits for Patient 1: a person is ‘authentic’
(eigentlich) only when she is confronted with her
vulnerability and thereby her mortality through her
disease (cf. [28]: 152) and struggles for survival. On
the other hand, however, the opposite holds for Patient
2: he defines himself essentially as a healthy person
and does not accept the diseased person he used to be
as himself. Furthermore, the fact that there is no
unifying account of the subjective experience of DBS
has implications with respect to how we understand
DBS treatment. Whereas the treatment for one person
can be authenticity-generating, for another, it has an
alienating effect.
Third, it is worth noting that Patient 2 correlates
authenticity, i.e. living his own life, with autonomy.
For Patient 2, in order to be himself, he must be
autonomous like an adult person, not dependent and
heteronomous like a child. He wants to return to the
autonomous social- and work-life he led before the
disease – and the treatment makes this possible.
This, of course, stands in sharp contrast to the
second- and third-person perspective of his wife.
According to her, her husband is alienated from himself
in ‘mode two’, the healthy state. She complains he
wants to ‘live the life of a young man’, i.e. a life that is
not only inappropriate to him in her eyes, but actually is
the life of someone else and not his. Additionally, now
that she as the caregiver is no longer needed and wanted,
she has lost all meaning in her life. She wants to get
divorced, because she feels alienated from her rela-
tionship with a person who she no longer views as her
husband.
The third case presented by Schüpbach et al. [6]
reveals yet another feature of authenticity and alienation.
Patient 3: ‘I want to be recognized as sick’
Patient 3, a 45-year-old female executive, married
with 3 children, had levodopa-responsive PD for
6 years […] with severe motor complications. Before
the operation, she was ashamed to be sick and
concealed her disease from her colleagues and
employer. She invested herself in her work, assumed
more and more responsibilities, and had great hopes
that the operation would help her to progress in her
career: ‘If I’m not operated in the coming months, the
beast is going to sleep. As long as I have my work, I
still exist; the day I can no longer go to work, it will
be as if the curtain came down on my life. ‘Six
months after the operation, she had no trace of a
motor handicap […]. She put off going back to work,
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however, because she felt anxious, had lumbar pain,
dizziness, difficulty walking, but had no neurologic
substrate. […]. An episode of severe depression was
treated successfully. Eighteen months after the oper-
ation, she had tried several times without success to
go back to work:’ I don’t have the same ability to
concentrate as before. I have a lot of work and prefer
to spend my time doing other things. ‘She requested
unjustified sick leaves, preferred to go out, buy things
on the Internet. She threatened to divorce, although
there had been no marital conflict before the opera-
tion. She announced her disease to her entourage, was
active in associations, and wanted to ‘be recognized
as sick.’ In short, a loss of professional status after the
operation occurred, in spite of spectacular motor
improvement, which was the cause of a marital
crisis.22
Here, at first glance, the picture is very similar to the
first case: now that the patient’s condition has improved,
she experiences leisure as authenticity, whereas she
experiences work as alienating. The cured patient prefers
to spend her time doing other things outside her
employment, spending money on the internet and joining
social activities. However, in contrast to the first case
study, it is interesting to see that now that the patient’s
body condition is improved drastically, she somehow
paradoxically wants her disease acknowledged.
Before the treatment, she had attempted to hide her
disease from her family, employer, and colleagues.
Now that she is better than before, it seems that she,
to a certain extent, actually denies being better and
does not want to recognize her own improvement.23
The fact that she demands attention for and recogni-
tion of her diseased state, even when she is ‘healthier’
than before, suggests that she identifies her diseased
state as her authentic state. Similarly to Patient 1, the
bodily self-image of Patient 3 seems to be dissociated
from her mind. Her mind is still that of a sick person,
although it has gained the strength to now recognize
and even publicly proclaim her disease, whereas her
body improved already – a fact that does not seem to
have made it through to her consciousness. Her battle-
cry is: ‘I want to be recognized as sick’, now that her
symptoms are much better than before surgery.
All in all, to me the case of Patient 3 reads like a
story of emancipation, revelation, or even revolt. It
even sounds as if she regarded her personal, retro-
spective coming out as a Parkinson’s patient as a
political mission, probably also willing to fight for the
rights of other people in her situation.24
If we use the notions of alienation and authenticity,
we can shed light on Patient 3’s experience. We could
interpret the patient’s situation before treatment as
alienating: she used to live a life under permanent
pressure, being an ambitious working mother who has
PD, and who, on the top of that, felt the need to
conceal her ailment. DBS helps this patient reach a
state authenticity, insofar as she is now able to be
sincere, honest, and self-confident with respect to
herself. In hindsight, the patient truthfully recognizes
her own past condition and pays herself due respect
for all she has undergone and has nevertheless
achieved. Paradoxically, this happens at the very
moment she experiences a substantial relief of most
of her preeminent PD symptoms. Her newly gained
self-confidence makes her demand full recognition for
her achievements from others as well. In this vein,
22 Schüpbach et al. [6]. The patient is reported by Schüpbach et
al. as saying ‘If I am not operated in the coming months.’
However, she rather seems to mean: ‘If I am operated in the
coming months …’
23 The case study mentions that the patient complains about
several physical symptoms for which ‘no neurological sub-
strate’ could be found. However, the reader might wonder
whether these symptoms still do have a physical cause and are
not only ‘psychologically’, but also ‘physiologically’ real. For
instance, when the patient complains about fatigue and a lack of
energy, this could be due to the switch to less medication after
surgery. As the authors remark: ‘Apathy after neurosurgery has
been attributed both to stimulation of the STN itself […] and to
the reduction of levodopa treatment after surgery […]’ ([6],
1812). The assessment of what is more a physical and what is
more a psychological symptom has to be left to medical
experts. For the sake of the argument, I will here follow the
authors’ suggestion that the patient’s unwillingness or inability
to go back to work has psychological causes only.
24 For a more detailed interpretation of this case, more
interview materials would be needed. On the one hand, the
condition of the patient after surgery is described as negative:
she has quit working, is having marital problems, and spends
her time spending money on the internet – and seems not to
realize and appreciate her physical improvement. On the other,
she has obviously gained self-confidence. It is this latter aspect
of her experience that can lead one to a positive interpretation
of the case, reading it as a story of emancipation. It would not
be appropriate to regard her simply as self-deceived: in fact,
Parkinson cannot be cured, but only its symptoms can be
relieved. In this regard, the patient is right in still claiming
recognition for her disease. Still, it is remarkable that her body
condition seems to be split up from her self-understanding
(what the authors call ‘a distressed mind in a repaired body’)
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due to the treatment, she has gained the strength to be
truthful and open with the people in her life, making
her disease public instead of shamefully trying to hide
it. Now that her bodily symptoms have remarkably
improved, it seems that the time is ripe for her to reap
some ‘reward’ and compensation for all the hardships
she underwent during her disease.
To sum up: interpreted this way, what is important
in this third case study is that the patient escapes from
felt-alienation through treatment and achieves a state
of authenticity as a result. Here, authenticity means
liberation and emancipation.
So far, I have offered an interpretation of these
three case studies within the philosophical framework
of authenticity and alienation; however, as I men-
tioned above, my interpretation differs from the
conclusions that the authors of the study draw. In
the following section, I want to turn my attention to
their conclusions and to what, from my vantage point,
is unsatisfying in their account.
The Psychologists’ Conclusions: Social
Maladjustment
Leaving the quantitative details aside, let’s consider
the conclusions drawn by Schüpbach et al. [6].25
Conducted within the framework of a psychological
and psychiatric assessment, the main aim of the study
was to show that treatment via DBS can result in
‘social maladjustment’, i.e. in patients having diffi-
culties getting along in their professional, social, and
private lives. As the authors put it:
There was a contrast between the marked
improvement in parkinsonian motor disability,
activity of daily living, and quality of life and
the fact that social adjustment did not improve.
[…] The operation is, therefore, likely to
contribute to social maladjustment […] ([6]:
1816).
The authors distinguish three areas of difficulties:
‘patient’s experience’, ‘the couple’, and ‘professional
activity’ ([6]: 1813f.).
The first category, ‘patient’s experience’, is the
most important one for this paper, and the authors of
the study associate it with different problems. The
most pressing issue given my purposes is that more
than the half of patients articulated ‘a feeling of
strangeness and unfamiliarity’ with themselves after
surgery, saying things like ‘I don’t feel like myself
any more’, or ‘I haven’t found myself again after the
operation’. This phenomenon is what I, from a
philosophical point of view, analyzed as Patient 1’s
loss of authenticity and feeling of alienation, i.e. a
‘relation of relationlessness’ to oneself.26 Further-
more, 20% of the patients reported that they reflected
negatively on the relation between their bodies and
the implant: as the authors remark, three female
patients ‘had difficulty accepting the presence of an
electronic device in their brains, saying things like ‘I
feel like a robot’, or ‘I feel like an electronic doll’.27
Among the other problems that appeared in the
category of ‘patient’s experience’ after surgery was
the fact that 41% of the patients complained about a
‘loss of vitality’ ([6]: 1813). Moreover, as is mirrored
in the title of the study already, another problem arose
for patients who became aware of the above-
mentioned tension between their ‘healed’ bodies and
their ‘distressed minds’, which were not yet able to
trust in the new bodily capacities (cf. [6]: 1814). Last
but not least, 41% complained of a ‘loss of aim in
life’. As the authors remark: [‘f]ighting PD was a
driving force for many patients’ that is no longer there
after surgery (cf. [6]: 1814).
Second, in relation to the category of ‘the couple’,
the authors point out that ‘following neurosurgery, the
majority of couples had new or continuing marital
conflicts’ (cf. [6]: 1814).
Third, with respect to the category of ‘professional
activity’, the authors remark that ‘work became a
secondary issue for many successfully operated
patients’ (cf. [6]: 1815).
What I want to emphasize here is the fact that the
authors of the study assess the change in the patients’
‘behavior as negative. As the report puts it, several
25 In order to gain a full appreciation of the study, its empirical
and quantitative details are well worth reading, but it would go
beyond the scope of this conceptual paper to discuss them in
depth.
26 For this formulation see Jaeggi ([25]:12) and Neuhouser, 25,
see FN 10 section Felt Authenticity and Felt Alienation: Some
Conceptual Clarifications of this paper.
27 The researchers add that ‘after struggling with the idea of
being implanted with an electronic device, one patient finally
coped well with it and made an artwork of her chest X-ray
showing the stimulator’ ([6]: 1813f.; cf. also the interpretation
of [9]: 139 of this case). A similar case of successive
adaptation, adjustment and finally acceptance of the device is
described in Müller et al. [7]: 307f.
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patients’ became more direct in their approach to
others’, became overly talkative, ‘irritable, and impa-
tient’ ([6]: 1814). The authors proceed as follows:
They expressed their opinions more freely and
revealed their formerly concealed PD to out-
siders, as if they had become disinhibited. As a
result, preexisting tension in a couple or a minor
deterioration of professional performance (in
terms of reliability, punctuality, correctness,
persistence) could degenerate into familial con-
flicts or maladjustment at work. ([6]:1814)
Here, the psychologists suggest that treatment
brings about negative results in the patients’ social
and professional lives. Indeed, the key-word in their
psychological diagnosis was ‘maladaptation”, a term
laden with negative value.
There are, of course, patients of whom I think they
would willingly accept ‘maladaptation’ as a description
of their own inner experience after surgery. To name only
one example, Patient 1 utters that she does not recognize
herself anymore under DBS ([6]: 1814). In this case, the
negative perspectives of the psychologists and the
patients indeed converge. However, there are cases,
such as Patient 2 and Patient 3, where the patients feel
authentic, i.e. have positive feelings after surgery, but
the psychologists still assess their situation negatively.
It is these latter cases that deserve closer attention
and a philosophical reevaluation. In contrast to the
psychological evaluation, in these and analogous
cases, my philosophical assessment suggests a different,
positive way the narratives should be interpreted: after
surgery, it is not maladjustment or alienation that the
patients experience, but rather self-proclaimed authentic-
ity.28 To be sure, the patients’ family and colleagues
have difficulty dealing with them after surgery. In this
sense, the patients in question indeed seem to no longer
be well-adapted to their environments. However, from a
philosophical point of view, the reader might wonder
whether there is anything intrinsically wrong with the
new attitudes and behavior of patients who describe their
own inner experience positively, as one of authenticity.
As I show in what follows, it is not at all clear that the
patients’ personality change should be regarded as
intrinsically negative. If the behavioral change turns
out to be positive and not just negative, then this may
have significant implications for the patients’ self-
understanding and future life, not to mention for how
we are to assess the patients after treatment.
Alienation from Alienating Conditions?
A Philosophical Re-evaluation
Whereas Schüpbach et al. [6] are of the opinion that the
treatment sometimes leads to social maladjustment and
thus interpret its outcome as negative, we should
wonder how the patients themselves describe their
change. In the patients’ reports, do they describe it as a
negative change? Or do they, instead, regard it as
positive and as an improvement? If they, after surgery,
describe their new life as authentic and their former
lives with PD as alienating, [37, 38] then there is
reason to suspect that those patients do regard the
outcome of DBS as a positive change. Indeed, one
could assume that they probably prefer not to be
‘adjusted’ any longer to their former lives, because
those lives are something they feel alienated from. In
other words: from the patients’ point of view, some of
them seem to have begun to feel alienated from
alienating conditions, and, therefore, no longer want
to adapt to them. Consequently, what appears as
negative ‘maladjustment’ to the psychologists and to
other third parties29 could be a positive experience for
the patients themselves, from their subjective point of
view. A philosophical perspective should pay attention
to this possibility because it could contribute to a more
well-informed ethical discussion of the treatment of
DBS patients.30 The philosophical results become
clearer if we have a look at the three case studies again.
Patient 1 states that she no longer recognizes herself
after treatment. In her case, DBS seems to have led to a
state of felt alienation.31 In her, treatment has not
28 My record simplifies an account that is much more nuanced
in reality. For instance, the paper gives exact figures and
mentions the positive sides of stimulation as well. The authors
point out that some patients describe the impact of surgery as a
life-changing positive event, as a ‘second birth’ or as ‘giving
birth’ ([6]: 1814). Further, the authors emphasize that, despite
all the difficulties ‘[n]one of the patients, however, wanted to
stop stimulation and go back on medication only’ (cf. [6]:
1814).
31 This sounds as if a Frankfurtian concept of authenticity could
be applied, cf. Frankfurt [34].
30 I do not think that a philosophical interpretation is per se
more adequate than the psychological one provided by
Schüpbach et al. Rather, as indicated in the introduction, I
think a philosophical approach could fruitfully complement the
psychological assessment.
29 Cf. also Müller et al. [7]
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brought about a positive change. However, in contrast,
Patients 2 and 3, according to their reports, indeed seem
to regard the treatment as authenticity-generating, in
spite of the fact that the psychologists assess the
outcome in the negative sense of ‘maladjustment’. The
story of Patient 3, as I suggested, can be interpreted
positively as one of revolt and liberation. Why should
be speaking out freely on one’s own disease be a sign of
‘disinhibition’ as the authors of the study put it? Why
should a society that discriminates against people who
are affected by a disease and that suggests revealing
their condition be an appropriate environment to which
one should adapt? Maybe the conditions under which
Patient 3 had been working were alienating, exploitative
and inhumane themselves, putting too much pressure on
her? Meanwhile, Patient 2, who explicitly states that he
regards the time when he had the disease as a time of
alienation, seems to now look forward to resuming his
professional life. As described in detail above and
according to his report, he perceives himself as being
awakened to his full consciousness. Yet, he seems to
now feel alienated from his marriage, and his wife
expresses her alienation from his ‘new personality’.
From a philosophical point of view, however, I think it
is by no means clear that his development should be
regarded negatively as a case of ‘maladjustment’.
Relative to the interests of the patient himself, it could
rather be that quitting this relationship (that seemed to
have had its smothering sides) could even be a step
towards more authenticity and autonomy for him.
If we understand cases 2 and 3 in this light, i.e.
as patients breaking free from previously alienating
conditions, it becomes doubtful whether they
themselves regard their behavioral changes as
‘maladjustment’. In this light, a philosophical
analysis should consider the possibility that for
them these changes could be positive, involving
‘insight’ or ‘revelation’.32 According to the reports,
for patients 2 and 3, under treatment it turned out
that they experienced their professional and/or love
life as alienating, and that they didn’t want to resume
it. It seems that they eventually found new ways of
leading their lives according to their new preferen-
ces.
In the Introduction, I claimed that it makes sense to
talk about the patients’ felt-authenticity and -
alienation when considering the chances and chal-
lenges of deep brain stimulation. Having discussed
the case studies in this light, I have shown that the
concepts of authenticity and alienation are helpful
heuristic instruments in interpreting DBS cases in a
philosophically meaningful way. In some cases, this
even leads to a new evaluation and a new assessment
of the patients that differs from the psychological one,
taking the subjective experiences of authenticity and
alienation into account.
Conclusions
What is the benefit of interpreting the case studies in
light of the notions of authenticity and alienation?
To begin, we saw that by employing the
philosophical framework of authenticity and alien-
ation, we are led to call into question the
psychological assessment of the three case studies
of Parkinson patients who underwent changes in
their personalities and preferences after successful
treatment with DBS [6]. The psychologists inter-
preted the behavioral changes in the patients in a
negative light, as forms of social maladjustment;
however, it turned out that appreciating the subjec-
tive dimension of felt-authenticity and -alienation
suggests that the patients’ experiences are more
nuanced than the psychologists recognized. We saw
that a philosophical re-interpretation of these cases
revealed that for some patients, what the psycholo-
gists called a ‘state of social maladjustment’ was
actually experienced by the patients as a positive
state, a ‘state of authenticity’.33 This suggests that
when evaluating the ethical, psychological, and
social implications of behavior changes that result
32 What strikes the reader is the gender aspect in these case
studies. I wish to thank the audience in Dortmund for drawing
my attention to this subject. The patient who experiences his
return to his professional life as authenticity-generating and his
private life as alienating is male, whereas the two patients who
feel alienated from their work-life and prefer to spend their time
primarily on leisure activities after DBS are female. With
respect to the aspects of authenticity and alienation, this allows
for at least two different interpretations: a) either the two
concepts are themselves pre-formatted by society (the study
stemming from France), or b) they are hollow, and are only
used to conceal gender-stereotyping.
33 This is, at least, how I interpret the narratives of patients 2
and 3 and of what I assume is the patients’ subjective
experience.
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from DBS, the subjective state of felt-authenticity
and felt-alienation should be taken into consider-
ation.
What’s more, when analyzing the case studies
from a philosophical point of view, aspects of the
patients’ experience are emphasized, which are not
fully appreciated in the psychological assessment.
As we saw above, for many of the patients, their
experience involved recognizing, exploring, and
enacting what they regarded as their ‘true selves’.
In this sense, part of the patients’ experiences
included coming to terms with feelings of authen-
ticity and alienation brought about by treatment.
Moreover, their narratives mirror different aspects
of authenticity and alienation in their relations to
their partners, their own bodies, and their profes-
sional occupations. Thus, an important part of the
patients’ experience involved the ways in which
felt-authenticity and felt-alienation was brought
about through treatment via DBS. While these
reported subjective dimensions seem important for
our understanding of patients’ experiences, they
were only brought to the fore when we employed
the philosophical tools of authenticity and alien-
ation.
What I have aimed to show in this paper is that we
should regard the concepts of authenticity and
alienation as, at least, possible factors we need to
take into account in the philosophical, ethical, and
medical considerations of DBS treatment.34 Future
research has to show whether the concepts of
authenticity and alienation really can help contribute
to a more nuanced understanding of such cases and
can eventually inform ethically responsible decision
making when it comes to the treatment of Parkinson
patients via deep brain stimulation. But, for now, we
should realize that this is research that ought to be
undertaken.
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